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Abstract
We analyze labor migration flows between two countries (regions) with different-sized populations and
different levels of productive efficiencies to determine the effects of such flows on income taxation. The
residents are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs, although they are otherwise iden-
tical. Each resident compares her post-tax revenue at home with that obtained abroad, including migration
costs, and each country’s government maximizes tax receipts. We study the existence of an equilibrium
for any configuration of wages and for any difference in the relative sizes of the countries (regions). Then,
we compute and characterize the equilibrium, whenever it exists, for any set of parameters, sizes and wage
differentials. Finally, we show that equilibrium migration flows affect the level of income taxation in both
the origin and destination countries.
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1 Introduction
Over the most recent two decades, the removal of political and economic barriers among member-states in
the EU has resulted in increasing mobility for the factors of production, including labor. A large body of
literature has analyzed the main drivers of international migration and identified various redistributive policies
of EU member-states to which migrants are highly sensitive.1 The idea that individuals decide where to live
by comparing net income levels in their country of origin with those of potential destination countries is now
commonly accepted in the theoretical literature and has been validated in the empirical literature. A natural
companion question involves the impact of migrations on optimal taxes. As early as 1968, Oates (1968) argued
that the combination of international factor mobility and tax competition among countries might lead to a
”race-to-the-bottom” in which governments would reduce tax rates to attract mobile factors of production –
or to disincentive their emigration – ultimately resulting in negative effects on welfare-state benefits due to
smaller public budgets. These negative effects are particularly painful in high-tax countries whose tax bases are
shrinking due to migrants’ movement to low tax jurisdictions.2
Recent advances in this field show that these theories do not hold in some circumstances. For example,
when accounting for heterogeneous migrants, i.e., unskilled vs skilled workers, international fiscal competition
has resulted in higher taxes than international fiscal coordination. Typically, when high-productivity and
capital-rich countries provide substantial welfare-state benefits, then unskilled migrants will be attracted to
these countries. As a consequence, more redistributive taxes must be implemented in these destination countries
(Razin, 2013). This increase in the fiscal burden on native-born citizens resulting from the arrival of migrants
helps explain why liberalizing migration is more difficult than international trade to coordinate among countries.
Other elements can also affect the race-to-the bottom process and have serious fiscal policy implications. In
particular, asymmetries in population size and/or productivity should also be expected to play an important
role in the interactions among national fiscal mechanisms. For instance, with respect to international size
asymmetry, a smaller country is expected to be more aggressive in tax competition than a larger rival because
the smaller country has less revenue to lose if some of its native citizens leave, and stands to gain a larger tax
base than its larger rivals from lowering its tax rates. Nonetheless, the argument is no longer quite so simple if
country size asymmetries are combined with productivity asymmetries.
To disentangle the influences of both size and productivity asymmetries among countries, a model is needed
to capture how income taxes and migration flows are interrelated ”in equilibrium” under such asymmetries.
In this study, we thus develop a two-country model with asymmetric productive efficiencies and asymmetric
population sizes. Formally, our model resembles that developed by Kanbur and Keen (1993) in which agents
live in two asymmetric countries with respect to size and become involved in cross-border shopping. There are
important differences, however, between our study and Kanbur and Keen (1993). In our framework, agents may
decide to leave the origin country and migrate to the other country in spite of incurring a positive migration cost:
1See, e.g., Wildasin (1988, 1991, 2006), Myers (1990), Epple and Romer (1991), Wellisch (2000), Hansen and Kessler (2001),
Piaser (2003), and Puy (2003), among others.
2Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) and Simula and Trannoy (2010) are two papers that analyze the role of migration in fiscal
competition depending on the type of migrants, namely skilled vs unskilled workers.
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a higher gross wage abroad acts as a powerful magnet for migrants, and larger income tax pressure operates
as a strong repellent. Hence, each resident compares the amount of her post-tax revenue obtained at home
with that obtained abroad, including the costs to be incurred due to migration.3 Further, individuals in each
country are heterogeneous with respect to their attachment to the home country: as a result, the cost of moving
abroad is heterogeneous across the population of residents. Some are strongly linked to their relatives living
in their home country, whereas others are considerably more mobile, simply because they are less attached to
the people living around them. National traditions, patriotism, historical origins and meteorological conditions
are other values to be considered that have varying degrees of influence across the citizens of a given country.4
Accordingly, individuals placed in otherwise similar situations seem to be heterogeneous in their willingness to
move abroad to find better economic conditions.
Each country’s government seeks to maximize its tax revenue, and countries are assumed to play a two-stage
game in this regard. In the first stage, each government is assumed to set its income tax and to take into account
the possible migration flow initiated as a consequence of its fiscal pressure. In the second stage, residents in
each country decide whether to stay in their own country or to migrate, thereby affecting the tax bases in both
their origin and destination countries.
Our main findings are as follows. Smaller countries are host countries for migration in the presence or absence
of a productivity advantage. In the absence of a large productivity gap in their favor, smaller countries reduce
income taxes. However, the well-known result from the tax competition literature – that smaller countries
always undercut taxes vis a vis larger countries – may not be true for income taxes. Indeed, we show that
with a high comparative advantage, the smaller country can tax income more than the larger country and still
maintain a higher net wage than that of the larger country.5 Finally, when migrants leave low productivity
countries for high productivity countries, migration reduces income tax rates in the origin country and increases
income tax rates in the destination country, when compared with a tax equilibrium with no productivity gap.
Conversely, when migrants quit high productivity countries in favor of low productivity countries, migration
increases income tax in the origin country and decreases income tax in the destination country, when compared
with the scenario with no productivity gap.6
In summary, our paper provides a two-fold contribution to the literature. First, it contributes to the theory of
labor migration by providing a framework in which individual choices to migrate from one country to another are
aggregated and simultaneously influence their respective governments when deciding to set income tax rates.
Using a stylized model to obtain a closed solution, we are able to identify the equilibrium income tax rates
chosen by the governments and the size and direction of migration flows between countries. Second, our paper
3These ingredients of the model recall the well-known Tiebout model (1956) that is designed to analyze the assignment of
heterogeneous individuals among different jurisdictions through local taxes. However, a major difference between the two approaches
is that individuals in our model are assigned a specific country at the outset and thus already have a country when having to decide
whether to move or stay.
4See Marchiori et al (2012) and Beine and Parsons (2012) for climatic determinants of international migration
5Nielsen (2002) also derives the possibility of a ”reverse commuting” equilibrium from the small country to the large. In that
paper, however, the cause is the different marginal cost of public funds between the countries.
6Notably, this finding is in line with Razin (2013), which discusses at length this type of migration effect in terms of migrants’
skills.
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contributes to the tax competition literature (Wilson 1980, 1982, 1992). We show that the benefit of smallness
can continue to hold in the case of labor migration and depends on the productivity gap between countries.
Finally, our approach in this paper allows us to consider the effects of countries’ structural discrepancies – such
as size and productivity – on national income taxes when these countries are engaged in fiscal competition.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is detailed in the next section. In Section 3, we characterize
the equilibrium. Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2 The model
Consider two countries of asymmetric sizes whose governments impose income taxes on their residents. The
governments’ goal is tax-revenue maximization. The population in each country is uniformly distributed over
types, and the set of types is represented in each country by the [0, 1] interval. In this unit interval, types are
ranked according to the migration cost when moving from one’s own country to the other, similar to Mansoorian
and Myers (1993). This cost is assumed to be equal to x for individuals of type x, x ∈ [0, 1] . Thus, migration
cost is the only source of heterogeneity among the agents. Let si denote the population density in the origin
country and sj the population density in the destination country, with si + sj = 1.
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Each type of resident is supposed to be endowed with one unit of labor sold on a (national) competitive
labor market. In country i, labor demand comes from a continuum of firms with an identical constant returns
to scale production function αiz, i = S,L. Then, competitive wages wS and wL are given by wS = αS and
wL = αL. Residents are free to decide where to live after comparing the net income that they will earn in each
country. We denote by ti, i = S,L, the tax in country i, ti ∈ [0, wi] . The income tax revenue of the government
is represented as siti in country i, and sjtj in country j, with i 6= j, i = S,L, j = S,L.
We define hereafter a game, with players consisting of the two governments and the residents of both
countries. The set of strategies for each government i, i = S,L, is the set of taxes ti ∈ [0, wi] that satisfies the
constraint that ti ∈ [0, wi]. As for the residents in country i, the strategy set consists of two elements: stay
in country i or move to country j, with i 6= j. The payoffs of this game are defined as follows. Let ti be the
strategy selected by government i. Then, the payoffs of country i and j are given by siti and sjtj , respectively,
with i 6= j, i = S,L and j = S,L. Now consider that the set of residents selecting the strategy stay in country
i. Then, it is easy to see that the set of residents’ types x in country i who have selected the strategy to move
to country j is necessarily given by the interval [0, x] with x defined by wi − ti = wj − tj − x. Those who have
selected the strategy to remain in country i are defined by the complementary interval ]x, 1]. It is clear that
it is necessary and sufficient that the value of x is strictly positive to obtain a non-null set of residents in i
choosing the strategy move to country j. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (t∗i , t
∗
j ) for the governments
to which corresponds a positive migration flow x∗ > 0 and a strategy for each resident in each country such that
no government can unilaterally increase its payoff by selecting another strategy, whereas no resident is willing
to move abroad (to stay at home) when he has chosen to stay at home (to move abroad).
7We will not use the equality si + sj = 1 to substitute one of the two population sizes to keep track of the size difference sj − si
throught out the model.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
When migration occurs from country i to country j, the last citizen type willing to leave from i to j obtains as
the solution of the equation wi − ti = wj − tj − x, namely
x = (ti − tj)− (wi − wj). (1)
Thus, a migration from i to j is possible at equilibrium if and only if x(t∗i , t
∗
j ) > 0, with x(t
∗
i , t
∗
j ) now satisfying
equation (1) . Mutatis mutandis, when migration occurs from j to i, then
x = (tj − ti) + (wi − wj). (2)
Clearly, the size and direction of migration depends not only on the difference between taxes, but also on the
difference, if any, between productivity levels, or equivalently, between wages in the two countries.
The resulting payoff of government in country i, i = S,L, is
Πi(ti, tj) =
 tisi (1− x) if (ti − tj)− (wi − wj) ≥ 0;ti (si + sjx) if (tj − ti) + (wi − wj) ≥ 0. (3)
Substituting (1) in the first line and (2) in the second, in Appendix A, we show that the best response function
of a smaller country is
tS(tL) =

1
2 tL +
wS−wL+1
2 if tL <
√
ss
sL
+ wL − ws;
1
2 tL +
sS
2sL
+ wS−wL2 if tL >
√
ss
sL
+ wL − ws.
(4)
Alternatively, the best response function of a large country is
tL(tS) =

1
2 tS +
1
2 (wL − wS + 1) if tS ≤ 1 + wS − wL;
tS + wL − wS if 1 + wS − wL ≤ tS ≤ sSsL + wS − wL;
1
2 tS +
1
2
(
sL
sS
+ (wL − wS)
)
if tS ≥ sSsL + wS − wL.
(5)
As in Kanbur and Keen (1993), the best response functions are quite different from one another. The best
response of a smaller country shows a discontinuity. As tL increases, the best response of the smaller country
is at first to increase tS above tL which is optimal as long as taxes are so low that undercutting does not pay.
However, when tL is quite large and a certain level of taxes is reached, namely
√
sS
sL
+ wL − wS , the smaller
country has an incentive to undercut taxes because the amount of tax revenue to be levied from migrants offsets
the tax revenue lost from natives. Hence, a smaller jurisdiction faces a greater potential of migrants and is thus
faced with a more (tax) elastic demand. This phenomenon is absent for the larger country. As a consequence,
its best response is a continuous function.
However, as opposed to Kanbur and Keen (1993), in our setup, the best response functions depend on the
differences in productivities between the countries. To illustrate the effect of these productivities on taxes, we
represent graphically the best replies in the plane (tL, tS). In this illustration, migration occurs from the larger
to the smaller country. Assume first, in Fig. 1, that wL = wS . Our model is reminiscent of Kanbur and Keen
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(1993) if wL = wS .
8 Under this condition, best replies in (4) and (5) depend only on the size asymmetry of the
countries. It follows that the intersection of best replies occurs below the 45◦ line, which implies that t∗S < t
∗
L :
smaller countries slash taxes because the amount of income brought by immigrants offsets lower tax rates.
Assume now that countries show different levels of productivity; for instance wL < wS (see Fig. 2). Compared
to Fig. 1, the tax equilibrium remains qualitatively the same. Hence, if the difference in productivities remains
low, then the result of Kanbur and Keen (1993) may yet be valid. In Fig 3, we continue to assume that
wL < wS but now the difference in wages is larger than in Fig 2. While the strategy to undercut the larger
country remains, the smaller country can now tax more than the larger country, as long as the net income in
the smaller country remains higher that the net income in the larger country. We will explore below whether
this property is satisfied at the Nash equilibrium.
At the interior candidate equilibrium, governments select the following taxes
t∗S =
2sS + sL
3sL
− wL − wS
3
and t∗L =
sS + 2sL
3sL
+
wL − wS
3
. (6)
The corresponding migration flow is equal to
x(t∗S , t
∗
L) =
1
3
(
wS − wL + sL − sS
sL
)
.
Taxes take admissible values, namely t∗S ∈ (0, ws) and t∗L ∈ (0, wL) if and only if
−sS + 2sL
sL
≤ wL − wS ≤ 2sS + sL
sL
and wS >
2sL + sS
sL
. (7)
8We are indebted to a referee to have highlighted this interesting remark for us.
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The above set is not empty because − sS+2sLsL < 2sS+sLsL for any sS and sL in the interval (0, 1) and any wS .9
In the set wL − wS < − sS+2sLsL , the candidate equilibrium taxes are t∗L = 0 and t∗S = 12 ( sSsL + wS − wL)
with x∗ = 12
sL(wS−wL)−sS
sL
. Finally, for wL − wS > 2sS+sLsL , the candidate equilibrium taxes are t∗S = 0 and
t∗L =
1
2 (wL − wS + 1) with x∗ = 12 (wL − wS − 1) .
It remains to be shown whether a Nash equilibrium exists. Recall that the best response of the smaller
country shows a discontinuity, whose presence jeopardizes the existence of an equilibrium. Let us define
A ≡
2sL + sS − 3sL
√
sS
sL
2sL
<
2sS + sL
sL
.
Then, we show the following10
Proposition 1 In the set − sS+2sLsL ≤ wL − wS ≤ A, a unique interior Nash equilibrium exists with migration
from the larger to the smaller country given by
t∗S =
2sS+sL
3sL
− wL−wS3 and t∗L = sS+2sL3sL + wL−wS3 and x(t∗S , t∗L) = wS−wL3 + sL−ss3sL .
In the set wL−wS < − sS+2sLsL , a unique Nash equilibrium exists with migration from the larger to the smaller
country given by
t∗L = 0 and t
∗
S =
1
2 (
sS
sL
+ wS − wL) and x∗ = 12 sL(wS−wL)−sSsL .
No Nash equilibrium exists for wL − wS > A.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Some remarks are in order. First, it is worth noting that in the set of values in which an equilibrium exists
migration occurs only from the larger to the smaller country. In fact, migration from the smaller to the larger
occurs when wL −wS > sL−sSsL . This condition is incompatible with wL −wS < A, because A < sL−sSsL for any
sL and ss in (0, 1) .
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Second, in our setup, as opposed to Kanbur and Keen (1993), the tax equilibrium may not exist. The
intuition for this result is as follows. On the one hand, in the presence of a large productivity advantage for the
larger country, the smaller country ”delays” its strategy of tax undercutting (in fact, the point of discontinuity
of its best reply depends positively on wL − wS). For the smaller country, it is optimal to select a higher
tax than the larger country for a wider set of tax levels, compared with the scenario wL = wS . It is as if the
productivity advantage of the larger country invalidates the convenience of tax undercutting. Although some
citizens emigrate to the foreign country, undercutting tS will not offset the difference wL − tL. On the other
hand, the larger country replies ”faster” with tL(tS) = tS + (wL − wS) due to its productivity advantage.
9Nonetheless, whenever wS ≤ 2sL+sSsL , then, in a subset of the interval, −
sS+2sL
sL
≤ wL − wS ≤ 2sS+sLsL , countries select to
tax the entire wage (see Appendix B for the detailed analysis).
10To keep the analysis readable we provide the equilbrium analysis for the case wS ≤ 2sL+sSsL in Appendix D.
11Note that in the set wL − wS > A, it is possible to identify Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, but the analysis is quite
intricate.
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Ultimately, tax undercutting occurs when the best reply of the larger country is tL = tS + (wL −wS), but this
destroys the existence of the equilibrium!
Finally, what is the role of size asymmetry? To answer this question, we can determine the tax equilibrium
when si = sj =
1
2 , while keeping different income levels. The candidate equilibrium taxes are then given by
t∗i =
1
3
(wi − wj) + 1 and t∗j =
1
3
(wi − wj) + 1. (8)
The corresponding value of x(t∗i , t
∗
j ) =
1
3 (wi−wj), which is positive if and only if wi > wj . Hence, we posit the
following:
Corollary 1 In the absence of population size asymmetry, an interior equilibrium exists that is given by (8)
with migration from the most-productive to the less-productive country.
Finally, some comparative statics on equilibrium taxes in (6) reveals that the equilibrium tax in country
i, i = S,L positively depends on the wage differential wi − wj . Further, equilibrium taxes in both countries
depend positively on the size of the destination country. Evidently, the smaller the country of destination, the
higher the incentive to undercut taxes for this country and therefore the smaller equilibrium taxes (because
taxes are strategic complements).
3.1 Kanbur and Keen (1993) revisited
In this section, we analyze the difference between the equilibrium taxes in (6) selected by the governments.
More specifically, we are interested in the sign of
t∗L − t∗S =
1
3
(
sL − sS
sL
+ 2 (wL − wS)
)
. (9)
As Fig. 1 shows, in the absence of a difference in productivities among countries, the smaller country faces
a higher tax elasticity of the tax base: decreasing taxes improves tax receipts because the tax revenue col-
lected from migrants is higher than the money lost from natives. Nonetheless, when there are differences in
productivities, there may be surprising results. In the absence of differences in productivities, wS = wL, we
have
t∗L − t∗S =
1
3
sL − sS
sL
and x∗ =
1
3
sL − sS
sL
. (10)
Investigating these two expressions, we claim as follows
Proposition 2 In the absence of a difference in productivities between countries, the unique equilibrium of the
tax game corresponds to a migration flow from the larger to the smaller country, with t∗S < t
∗
L.
Proof. Follows immediately from the sign of (10).
Hence, as in Kanbur and Keen (1993), if countries do not differ in productivity levels, the only equilibrium
strategy of the smaller country is to undercut the larger country with respect to taxes. At equilibrium, because
the smaller country selects lower income taxes and wages are equal, it is obvious to conclude that the migration
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flows originate from the country with the lower net income with the other country as destination. At equal
wages, the direction of migration is fully determined by the relative level of taxes.
We now turn our attention to the scenarios in which countries differ in productivity levels and thus in wages.
Using (6) to study the sign of the difference t∗L − t∗S , we have
t∗L < t
∗
S if and only if wS − wL >
sL − sS
2sL
. (11)
This condition of wL lies in the admissible set (7) because
sS−sL
2sL
< sL−sSsL which reveals that the equilibrium of
migration from the larger to the smaller country is characterized by t∗L < t
∗
S if and only if the condition in (11)
holds. Otherwise, if wS − wL < sL−sS2sL , the equilibrium of migration from the larger to the smaller country is
characterized by t∗L > t
∗
S . It is straightforward that this property also holds for the equilibrium in which t
∗
L = 0
and t∗S =
1
2 (
sS
sL
+ wS − wL).
Hence, we summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 A smaller country that is a destination country for migrants sets a higher income tax than the
larger country of origin, if it shows a much higher productivity level than the larger country, i.e. if wS − wL >
sL−ss
2sL
. Conversely, if wS − wL < sL−ss2sL , then the smaller country sets a lower income tax than the larger
country.
The novel approach of this proposition lies in its first part: the smaller jurisdictions do not always have to
undercut taxes to attract migrants. In fact, our result concerning income taxation in smaller countries departs
from the previous literature on capital mobility (Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1986) and cross-border shopping
(Kanbur and Keen, 1993). As we explained above, this literature highlights the benefit of smallness: smaller
countries gain in the competition for mobile capital because they undercut their larger rivals with respect to
taxes, taking advantage of a higher elasticity of tax receipts. It turns out that this result does not always hold
true when labor is mobile and when the gross salary in the larger country is much smaller than the gross salary
paid in smaller countries. Our result resembles the results obtained in some recent papers on mobile capital,
such as Justman et al., 2002, Zissimos and Wooders, 2008, Hindriks et al., 2008, or Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011.
In these papers, smaller countries can fix higher capital taxes than the larger countries as long as they supply a
higher level of public infrastructure that compensates for the higher taxes. Similarly, in our paper, we find that
a smaller country can set higher income taxes than a larger country when it has a higher level of productivity.
3.2 Migration and income taxation
In this section, using the interior equilibrium in taxes, we study the effects of migration on taxes, taking as a
benchmark the scenario in which the level of productivity among countries is the same. To this end, we must
compare taxes in (6) and taxes corresponding to the scenario wS = wL, namely t˜
∗
L =
2sL+sS
3sS
and t˜∗S =
sL+2sS
3sL
.
We find as follows
Proposition 4 When migrants leave lower-productivity countries and move to higher-productivity countries,
migration causes an increase in the income tax in the destination country and a decrease in the income tax
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in the origin country, compared with the equilibrium tax when countries are characterized by the same level of
wages.
Proof. Comparing (6) with t˜∗L =
2sL+sS
3sS
and t˜∗S =
sL+2sS
3sL
, we find t∗L − t˜∗L = wL−wS3 and t∗S − t˜∗S = wS−wL3 .
Hence, if wL < wS , then t
∗
L < t˜
∗
L and t
∗
S > t˜
∗
S .
This scenario recalls the result in Razin (2013). Migrants may increase taxes in the destination country,
which is why natives may be against migratory flows. Nonetheless, in our paper the mechanism that leads to this
result is different. We identify two different drivers for migrants to move from an origin country to a destination
country. First, a high relative productivity efficiency acts as a powerful attractor because it immediately affects
wages. Accordingly, the higher the productivity in a country, the stronger the incentive for native-born citizens
to stay in this country and for those citizens living in the other country to migrate there. Nonetheless, migration
is also affected by a second driver, namely income tax, with a relatively high income tax acting as a repellent
to migrants. As a result, the migration flow observed between countries is dependent on the relative strength of
these drivers, and net income is the decision criterion for migrants when selecting their strategy. Thus, a highly
productive country can set a relatively high income tax and continue to be attractive for migrants whenever
the net income resulting from its fiscal burden is larger than that in the alternative country.
Conversely, we posit as follows:
Proposition 5 When migrants leave higher-productivity countries and move to lower-productivity countries,
migration leads to a decrease in income tax in the destination country and an increase in income tax in the
origin country, compared with the equilibrium tax when countries show the same level of wages.
Proof. Being t∗L − t˜∗L = wL−wS3 and t∗S − t˜∗S = wS−wL3 , if wL > wS , then t∗S < t˜∗S and t∗L > t˜∗L.
When gross wages are different, migration mitigates the difference in net wages. Furthermore, as the tax
competition occurs between countries with different wages, the race to the bottom analogy no longer applies.
In fact, compared with the benchmark in which countries share the same productivity, countries react in the
opposite way in their fiscal behavior: whereas the larger country reduces its fiscal burden at equilibrium, the
smaller country increases its income tax. Thus, it weakens the incentive for both countries to coordinate their
fiscal regimes, thereby preventing the adoption of tax harmonization measures.
4 A brief discussion of our main assumptions
Let us now briefly discuss two key assumptions of our approach: exogenously given wages and tax revenue
maximizing governments.
First, we develop our analysis by assuming that the difference in wages between countries is exogenously
given and that migration does not directly affect this difference. Neglecting this aspect in the analysis has
its drawbacks but might be justified by observing that strong local disparities in wages remain in Europe, in
spite of the process of integration among European countries and the removal of barriers to free movement of
physical and human capital, (Eurostat, 2013). Even worse, the impact of integration has been uneven, thereby
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amplifying the existing inequalities among European countries and regions within countries (Bradley et al.,
2005). A key explanation for these discrepancies lies in local differences in productive efficiency, which derive
mainly from country-specific institutions. In this view, institutions are responsible for enhancing productivity
by providing local public goods (like infrastructure) and local property rights: poor institutions lead to poor
efficiency in production for a country (or a region) (Acemoglu et al, 2005). Notably, this view meets with
approval not only in the academic community but also among policy makers: Article 174 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU states as follows: ”the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels
of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions”. Consistent with
this statement, the EU devotes one-third of the total European budget to the so-called EU Regional Policy –
or the Cohesion Policy –, thereby testifying to an awareness that the free movement of goods and/or factors
induced by integration does not suffice to remove local disparities. Thus, assuming that wages are country-
specific and exogenously given enables us to clarify how structural characteristics impact migration. This issue
seems to be particularly salient when taking into account the recent European enlargement process: in 2004,
eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe acceded to EU membership, followed in 2007 by
Bulgaria and Romania. As an immediate consequence of these new accessions, economic disparities have been
exacerbated with a concurrent change in the spatial distribution of wealth. The greater part of EU Regional
Policy funds, known as structural and cohesion funds, are addressed to the most disadvantaged European
regions and are mainly devoted to developing large-scale infrastructure and innovations for enhancing efficiency.
This enlargement process represents a challenge for the criteria of Regional Policy and risks to frustrate the
(questioned) propelling effects coming from Cohesion funds because it reinforces cross-country inequalities in
the EU.12
From this perspective, our analysis complements the large strand of literature that studies whether (real)
wages are affected by migration (see Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2008, for a survey). Although the argument
that migrants reduce the real wages and employment opportunities of native workers is rather widespread, the
empirical evidence gathered so far does not lead to clear results regarding the effects of migration on local labor
markets. Furthermore, the impact of migration in a specific country may not be generalized to other countries
because it depends inter alia on specific structural characteristics of the destination country, such as the skill
mix, the type of unions, the unemployment rate, and the migration policy. For example, migration typically
increases housing prices in the destination country (Saiz, 2006) with possible negative effects on the real wages
of workers. Nonetheless, as this rise in housing prices represents an income transfer from migrants to natives –
the owners of houses – the net effect on income of natives can also be positive! For example, in Ottaviano and
Peri (2006), the small negative wage effect from migration is more than offset by the positive effect on housing
prices from which natives benefit due to their higher house ownership rates. Additionally, the type of migrants
– skilled vs unskilled – can play a role in defining the effects of migration into the host country. The negative
impact seems to be stronger when unskilled workers are taken into account, whereas it turns out to be moderate
in the case of high-skilled workers (Borjas, 2003, Borjas and Katz, 2005, and Borjas, 2006). Note, however,
that even when the analysis is performed by considering both the geographical location and the education level
12See Pellegrini et al. 2013 on the effectiveness of the Regional Policy.
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of workers (migrants and native workers), sometimes migration is found to have only a small impact on wages
(Card, 2001); however, in certain other cases, large negative effects have been found (Borjas, Friedman and
Katz, 1997) emerge.
The second assumption involves the objective function of the governments. For analytical tractability, we
assume that governments are tax-revenue maximizers. This assumption should not be read as equivalent to
assuming Leviathan governments. Governments in our paper do not have as their primary interest to maximize
tax revenues to raise rents/bribes or to enhance the power of government officials. Instead, in our view, they
tax to provide essential public goods as schools, transport infrastructure and hospitals – public goods that affect
the welfare of citizens without necessarily changing their wages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the optimal taxation set by two countries with asymmetric population sizes and
different productivities when residents in each country can freely move from one country to another, and choices
to migrate depend on the net income corresponding to the optimal income taxes. Thanks to the simplicity of
the model, we were able to develop our analysis by explicitly computing the equilibrium values of the main
variables at play: income taxes, and the direction and size of migration flows. The parameters used to obtain
this description are the populations’ sizes and the productivity (wage) available in each of the two countries. On
one hand, the income tax values in each country mutually depend on one another because their level modifies
the incentives to migrate between the two countries. On the other hand, the migration flow determines the
optimal taxation in each country. The equilibrium tax rates are then described in the entire set of possible
combinations of relative size and relative wage existing in each.
This model could be used to test whether its theoretical findings are indeed supported by the data. For
instance, it might be interesting to analyze how the data fit the proposition made by previous authors that no
migration occurs from a smaller to a larger country. Countries such as Luxemburg and Portugal, or Ireland and
Poland, respectively, might be used as examples for such an empirical analysis.
Appendices
Appendix A: Best responses
The payoff function in (3) rewrites as
Πi(ti, tj) =
 tisi (1− ((ti − tj)− (wi − wj))) if ti ≥ tj + (wi − wj);ti (si + sj ((tj − ti)− (wj − wi))) if ti ≤ tj + (wi − wj).
To derive the best response functions we proceed in steps.
STEP 1. Let us first define the piece of the best response when migrants quit country i, namely when
ti ≥ tj + wi − wj . When the tax of country i is strictly higher than tj + (wi − wj), we maximize the payoff
function tisi (1− ((ti − tj)− (wi − wj))) , finding
12
ti(tj) =
1
2
tj +
wi − wj + 1
2
. (12)
Since ti ≥ tj+wi−wj , then it must hold 12 (tj + wi − wj + 1) ≥ tj+(wi−wj), which happens if tj ≤ 1+wj−wi.
Therefore, when migrants quit country i, the best response function of country i is
ti(tj) =
 12 tj +
wi−wj+1
2 if tj ≤ 1 + wj − wi
tj + wi − wj if tj ≥ 1 + wj − wi
For later use, we calculate the corresponding payoff
Πi(ti, tj) = si
(
1
2
tj +
1
2
wi − 1
2
wj +
1
2
)2
, (13)
if tj ≤ 1 + wj − wi and
Πi(ti, tj) = (tj + wi − wj) si, (14)
if tj ≥ 1 + wj − wi.
STEP 2. We now determine the best reply of country i were migrants entering country i, namely for
ti ≤ tj + wi − wj . Similarly to above, when ti < tj + wi − wj , the piece of best response is
ti(tj) =
1
2
tj +
si
2sj
+
wi − wj
2
.
Since ti(tj) ≤ tj + (wi − wj), we find sisj + wj − wi ≤ tj . Hence, the best reply of country i, were migrants
entering this country, is
ti(tj) =
 tj + wi − wj if tj ≤ sisj + wj − wi;1
2 tj +
si
2sj
+
wi−wj
2 if tj ≥ sisj + wj − wi.
The corresponding payoff of country i is
Πi(ti, tj) = (tj + wi − wj) si, (15)
if tj ≤ sisj + wj − wi. And
Πi(ti, tj) =
1
4
(si + sjtj + sjwi − sjwj)2
sj
, (16)
if tj ≥ sisj + wj − wi.
STEP 3. To build the overall best response, we shall now consider the corresponding payoff in the intervals:
• ti < min
{
1 + wj − wi; sisj + wj − wi
}
. Comparing (13) and (15) , we find that the best response in this
interval is
ti(tj) =
1
2
tj +
wi − wj + 1
2
;
• ti > max
{
1 + wj − wi; sisj + wj − wi
}
. Comparing the payoffs (14) and (16) , we find that the best
response in this interval is
13
tj(ti) =
1
2
tj +
si
2sj
+
wi − wj
2
;
• when sisj < 1, there exists an intermediate, non-empty, interval given by
si
sj
+ wj − wi < tj < 1 + wj − wi.
The payoff (13) is higher than the payoff (16) for wj − wi −
√
si
sj
< tj < wj − wi +
√
si
sj
. Furthermore
wj−wi−
√
si
sj
< sisj +wj−wi < wj−wi +
√
si
sj
< 1 +wj−wi holds. Therefore, when i is a small country,
the best response is always discontinues at wj − wi +
√
si
sj
and writes as in (4).
• When sisj > 1, we have wj − wi −
√
si
sj
< 1 + wj − wi < wj − wi +
√
si
sj
< sisj + wj − wi.
Being (13) smaller than the payoff (16) for t > wj − wi +
√
si
sj
and t < wj − wi −
√
si
sj
, the best reply of a
large country is continues and writes as (5) .
Appendix B: Admissible set
The non-negativity conditions for equilibrium taxes in (6) are:
t∗S ≥ 0⇔
2sS + sL
3sL
− wL − wS
3
≥ 0⇔ wL − wS ≤ 2sS + sL
sL
,
t∗L ≥ 0⇔
sS + 2sL
3sL
+
wL − wS
3
≥ 0⇔ wL − wS ≤ −sS + 2sL
sL
,
implying
−sS + 2sL
sL
≤ wL − wS ≤ 2sS + sL
sL
.
Taxes-non–higher-than-wages conditions are:
tS ≤ wS ⇔ 2sS + sL
3sL
− wL − wS
3
≤ wS ⇔ wL − wS ≥ 2sS + sL
sL
− 3wS ,
tL ≤ wL ⇔ sS + 2sL
3sL
+
wL − wS
3
≤ wL ⇔ wL − wS ≥ sS + 2sL
2sL
− 3wS
2
.
Hence,
wL − wS ≥ wM ≡ max
(
sS + 2sL
2sL
− 3wS
2
;
2sS + sL
sL
− 3wS
)
.
Two cases may arise: (i) either in the set (7) taxes are always smaller than wages, or (ii) in a subset of (7)
taxes exceed wages (it is easily verified that taxes are not always higher than wages in the set (7)).
Case (i). This case occurs when wM is smaller than the lower bound of (7), namely
sS + 2sL
2sL
− 3wS
2
< −sS + 2sL
sL
⇔ wS > 2sL + sS
sL
;
2sS + sL
sL
− 3wS < −sS + 2sL
sL
⇔ wS > sL + ss
sL
.
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with 2sL+sSsL >
sL+ss
sL
. Hence, when wS >
2sL+sS
sL
, in the set (7) taxes are both non-negative and smaller than
wages.
Case (ii). This case may occur when sL+sSsL < wS <
2sL+sS
sL
. Then, two intervals exists in (7). First, for
− sS+2sLsL < wL−wS < 2sS+sLsL −3wS , taxes are t∗S = wS and t∗L = wL. Whereas, for 2sS+sLsL −3wS < wL−wS <
2sS+sL
sL
, both taxes are smaller than wages.
This case occurs also when sS+2sLsL < wM <
2sS+sL
sL
namely wS <
sL+ss
sL
. In this range of values of wS , two
intervals exists in the admissible set, as well. First (i.e. − sS+2sLsL < wL − wS < 2sS+sLsL − 3wS), t∗S = wS and
t∗L = w
∗
L, then (i.e.,
2sS+sL
sL
− 3wS < wL − wS < 2sS+sLsL ), t∗S < wS and t∗L < wL.
Appendix C: Existence of an equilibrium
A necessary and sufficient condition that guaranties the existence of equilibrium is that the best reply of the
larger country, evaluated at the discontinuity point, is smaller than the best response of the smaller country.13
Indeed, when this condition is satisfied, the best responses, which have slopes smaller than one, will intersect in
the positive quadrant, guaranteeing the existence of the tax equilibrium. The necessary and sufficient condition
is satisfied if it holds:
1
2sL
 ss + sL (√ sssL + wL − ws)
+sLws − sLwL
 > 2(√ ss
sL
+ wL − ws
)
− wL + ws − 1,
which boils down to
wL − wS < A.
Hence, if the wage differential is upperbounded, i.e., wL −wS < A, then an equilibrium in taxes always exists.
For illustration, an equilibrium does not exist in Fig 4 where ss = 0.2, sL = 0.8, wL = 5.1 and wS = 2. While
in Fig 5, for ss = 0.2, sL = 0.8, ws = 2.3, wL = 2, being the necessary condition satisfied, the tax equilibrium
exists.
13This condition is always satisfied guaranteeing always an equilibrium in the seminal paper of Kanbur and Keen (1993).
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Appendix D: Equilibrium analysis when wS ≤ 2sL+sSsL
As we showed in Appendix B, when wS ≤ 2sL+sSsL , countries may tax the whole wage. The question we answer in
this section is : Can t∗L = wL and t
∗
S = wS be a Nash equilibrium? To answer, we shall check the compatibility
of wS ≤ 2sL+sSsL with the area in which an interior equilibrium exists, namely − sS+2sLsL < wL − wS < A.
By direct comparison, it is readily verified that for wS <
sS+sL
√
sS
sL
2sL
(where
sS+sL
√
sS
sL
2sL
< 2sL+sSsL ), we have
A < 2sS+sLsL − 3wS . Then, in the set − sS+2sLsL < wL − wS < A the Nash equilibrium is t∗S = wS , t∗L = wL and
x∗ = 0.
For
sS+sL
√
sS
sL
2sL
< wS <
2sL+sS
sL
, in the set wL−wS < 2sS+sLsL −3wS , the Nash equilibrium is t∗S = wS , t∗L = wL
and x∗ = 0; whereas in the set 2sS+sLsL − 3wS < wL − wS < A the Nash equilibrium is given by (6).
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